## **Tutorial** 7

## 1. Cooperative games

**Exercise 1.** Consider bimatrix game

$$(A,B) = \begin{pmatrix} (a,2) & (3,0) \\ (2,0) & (2,2) \end{pmatrix},$$

where a > 2 is arbitrary. Find the maximin values of the two players and the arbitrary pair as functions of a.

Solution. Since

$$B = B^T = \begin{pmatrix} 2 & 0 \\ 0 & 2 \end{pmatrix},$$

the maximin value for Player II is  $v_{B^T} = 1$ . To find  $v_A$ , note that for  $x \in [0, 1]$ ,

$$(x, 1-x)A = (x, 1-x) \begin{pmatrix} a & 3 \\ 2 & 2 \end{pmatrix} = ((a-2)x + 2, x+2).$$

We need to consider three cases: a = 3; a > 3; and 2 < a < 3.

If a = 3, A has a saddle point 3, hence  $v_A = 3$ . The status quo point is  $(v_A, v_{B^T}) = (3, 1)$ . We draw the cooperative region as in Figure 3. In this case, the bargaining set is the singleton  $\{(3, 2)\}$ . Hence the arbitration pair is (3, 2).

If a > 3, A still has saddle point 3, hence  $v_A = 3$ . The cooperative region is shown in Figure 4. Now the bargaining set is the singleton  $\{(a, 2)\}$ . Hence the arbitration pair is (a, 2).

If 2 < a < 3, A has saddle point a, then  $v_A = a$ . The status quo point is (a, 1). We draw the cooperative region as in Figure 5. The bargaining set











Figure 3

is the line segment joining (a, 2) and  $(\frac{a+3}{2}, 1)$ . To find the arbitration pair, consider

$$g(u, v) = (u - a)(v - 1).$$

The line joining (a, 2) and (3, 0) is  $v = \frac{2}{a-3}(u-3)$ . Hence in the bargaining set, we have

$$g(u,v) = (u-a)\left(\frac{2}{a-3}(u-3) - 1\right)$$
$$= \frac{2}{a-3}u^2 - \frac{3(a+1)}{a-3}u + \frac{a(a+3)}{a-3}.$$

It is easy to see g attains its maximum at  $u = \frac{3(a+1)}{4}$ ,  $v = \frac{3}{2}$ . Hence the arbitration pair in this case is  $(\frac{3(a+1)}{4}, \frac{3}{2})$ .

To sum up, we have: if  $a \ge 3$ , then  $v_A = 3$ ,  $v_{B^T} = 1$ , the arbitration pair is (a, 2); if 2 < a < 3, then  $v_A = a$ ,  $v_{B^T} = 1$ , the arbitration pair is  $(\frac{3(a+1)}{4}, \frac{3}{2})$ .

**Exercise 2.** Consider the two-person game with bimatrix

$$(A,B) = \begin{pmatrix} (5,0) & (-3,1) & (-2,0) \\ (2,4) & (2,3) & (4,-2) \end{pmatrix}$$

(i) Find  $v_A$  and  $v_{B^T}$ .

(ii) Sketch the cooperative region of the game.

(iii) Using  $(\mu, \nu) = (v_A, v_{B^T})$  as the status quo point, find the arbitration pair of the game.

**Solution**. (i) We have

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} 5 & -3 & -2 \\ 2 & 2 & 4 \end{pmatrix}, B = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 4 & 3 & -2 \end{pmatrix}, B^{T} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 4 \\ 1 & 3 \\ 0 & -2 \end{pmatrix}.$$



Figure 4

Note that A has saddle point 2, B has saddle point 1. Hence  $v_A = 2, v_{B^T} = 1$ .

(ii) The cooperative region is shown in Figure 1.

(iii) The line joining (2, 4) and (5, 0) is given by

$$v = \frac{0-4}{5-2}(u-5) = -\frac{4}{3}(u-5).$$

Let v = 1, we have  $u = \frac{17}{4}$ . Hence the bargaining set is the line segment joining points (2, 4) and  $(\frac{17}{4}, 1)$ . Let g(u, v) = (u - 2)(v - 1). Then on the bargaining set, we have

$$g(u,v) = (u-2)(-\frac{4}{3}(u-5)-1) = -\frac{4}{3}u^2 + \frac{25}{3}u - \frac{34}{3}.$$

It is easy to see that g attains its maximum at  $u = \frac{25}{8}$ . In this case,  $v = -\frac{4}{3}(\frac{25}{8}-5) = \frac{5}{2}$ . Hence the arbitration pair is  $(\frac{25}{8}, \frac{5}{2})$ .